Competitive behavior in commercial television broadcasting is modeled to examine program choice and the effects of more channels being available on firm strategy. Specifically, broadcasters compete by selecting both the "type" and quality level of a program to offer, but do not compete on price. We obtain five major results. First, a comparison of monopoly and duopoly markets indicates that broadcasters in an industry with a larger number of competitors may provide programs of lower quality compared to broadcasters in an industry with a smaller number. Second, in terms of viewer welfare, having more channels available is not necessarily "better." Third, broadcasters tend to choose an intermediate level of differentiation in terms of the types of programs they provide, resulting in a "counter programming" strategy. In other words, avoidance of price competition is nor required for competitors to differentiate themselves from each other. Fourth, if one broadcaster starts the evening with a higher quality (higher rated) program than its competitor, its second program should also be of higher quality. Finally, a broadcaster's first program should be of equal or higher quality than its second program. Put another way, it always behooves a broadcaster to "lead with its best."
budgets, better performers, more rehearsal, better scripts and locations-especially when we have otherwise comparable choices on other channels. This will lead to increased spending on program quality as more channels become available to compete for more viewers' attention."
In contrast, Don Hewitt (the executive producer of 60 Minutes, and reported in Jankowski and Fuchs 1995) responding to a question about the effect on quality of the projected increase in the number of television channels that will be available to viewers in the future indicated that "If viewers ten years hence are still trying to find eight hours a day of worthwhile television fare, they're not going to find it then any more than they can find it now."
Our analysis indicates that a range of the cost of quality provision exists in which broadcasters in markets with fewer competitors provide higher quality programs than do broadcasters in markets with a greater number of competitors. Thus, the optimal strategy of broadcasters moves toward relative "narrowcasting" as the number of competitors increases.
In general, having more options to choose from is considered to be unambiguously beneficial for consumers. Thus the final research question is the implications of having more viewing options (the primary impact of the recent technological and regulatory changes) for the viewing publics' well-being. In what may be the most unexpected, and in many ways counter-intuitive, result of our analysis, we find that increasing the number of viewing options (the number of broadcasters in the market) does not necessarily make the average viewer better-off. Under a set of very plausible circumstances viewers are, on average, better-off when they have fewer viewing options to choose from. Our findings in this area are due to the interplay between having a larger number of broadcasters in the market (which results in viewers, on average, having the choice of an alternative that more closely matches their tastes) and the effect this larger number of broadcasters has in reducing the average quality of programs provided. Over some ranges of the cost of quality provision, the quality reduction effect dominates the increased average match of program types to viewer tastes, resulting in a reduction in average utility levels. These results prove robust under a number of extensions to our basic model. For instance, the viewer welfare results still obtains when broadcasters
The Conceptual Model and Its Assumptions

The basic framework
Following the well established research stream based on the work of Hotelling (1929) , our analysis makes use of a two dimensional (quality/location) "linear city" spatial competition model. We assume that program "type" characteristics can be represented by a single "horizontal" dimension bounded within the unit interval. We first examine a static model, and then extend it into two periods. Consistent with the empirical reality of television broadcasting, much of our analysis is based on the assumption that the number of broadcasters is exogenously determined. Finally, we assume that each broadcaster has only a single "channel" in the market. Relaxing this assumption would greatly complicate the analysis, and probably would not alter our main findings. Having said this, it is our belief that relaxing this assumption would lead to a number of other important findings, however, doing so is beyond the scope of the present study.
Viewer behavior
We model the potential utility a viewer receives from watching a particular program as depending on both the extent to which the program's "type" matches the viewer's taste, and the quality of that program, assuming that quality depends only on the program's production values. The objective behind this structure is to allow for the possibility that a viewer who is not a "fan" of crime dramas may be willing to view a particular crime drama program if that program is particularly well done.
Formally, a viewer's utility function for a particular program is given by , where is the the set of all available program alternatives.
The analysis contained in this paper is based on the assumption that viewer tastes follow a uniform distribution across the horizontal dimension ( £ ). This allows us to concentrate on the consequences of competitive forces. However, numerical analysis using bipolar and unimodal distributions based on the symmetric beta distribution reveals that most of our findings hold under these alternative distributions of viewer tastes.
Broadcasters' revenues and costs
In the "two market" structure of commercial television, a broadcaster's revenues are derived from selling time to advertisers. The revenue a broadcaster can receive for a program depends almost entirely on the number of viewers (the ratings) a program receives. While the uncontrollable elements of program quality are undeniably important, the importance of the controllable element of program quality, a program's production values, should not be underestimated, and the level of those production values are directly linked to the size of a program's budget. Barwise and Ehrenberg (1988, pg. 96) clearly make this point when they state:
"Television producers can also cut costs by using fewer or cheaper production resources: fewer cameras, fewer locations, more work in the studio, fewer and lesser stars, less rehearsal, a lower allowance of film stock per minute of final output, less expert editing, and so on....However, substantially reducing production values almost inevitably tends to reduce the appeal of the program for the viewer."
Similar arguments have been made by Jankowski and Fuchs (1995) , and others.
While recognizing that the quality of a TV program extends beyond program cost, we believe that production value captures an important portion of a program's inherent quality. In practice, the Australian Broadcasting Tribunal (ABT) relies on program cost as a proxy for program quality (Wright 1994) . Our models will thus focus on the economic aspect (i.e., the controllable elements) of program quality.
Not only is providing high quality (i.e., high production value) programs expensive, incremental improvements in quality appear to be increasingly difficult to obtain as quality levels increase.
To capture this situation, we assume that the cost of quality provision is quadratic in the level of quality, with parameter 3.1 The modeling framework and behavior of a monopoly broadcaster Figure 1 illustrates the demand-side of the model based on the utility structure of equation (1). In the figure the horizontal axis measures both the range of ideal points of viewers for a program's type (bounded within the unit interval) and the location of the monopoly broadcaster's program (point d) along the type dimension. The vertical dimension measures both the utility level that a viewer receives from viewing the monopoly broadcaster's program, and the quality level of that 4 Under this normalization represents an "index" of the cost of quality relative to the advertising rate (i.e., ). For ease of exposition, we will refer to simply as "the cost of quality provision" in the remaining sections. Note that becomes lower when is higher (all other things being equal). As we will see from the equilibrium results, this is likely to be the reason why U.S. commercial broadcasters, which serve a large and affluent market, are able to produce such high quality television programming.
program (v) . Viewers who have ideal points located at k or m are indifferent between viewing the monopoly broadcaster's program and doing something else. Viewers with ideal points that are to the left of k or to the right of m would prefer to engage in another activity rather than viewing the program. The utility levels of viewers whose ideal points lie between k and m are traced out by the triangle klm.
5 6 The area of this triangle is equal to the total viewer surplus from the broadcaster's program. Since the distribution of viewer ideal points along the type dimension is assumed to be uniform, the distance between points k and m is equal to the monopoly broadcaster's ratings (i.e., the fraction of all potential viewers that actually view the program).
The impact of higher program quality levels on the part of the monopoly broadcaster is examined in Figure 2 . For illustrative purposes, the monopolist's location is fixed at d = 1/2. However, at a quality level of v, the monopolist is indifferent between any location along the type dimension between v and 1 -v, inclusive. The monopolist would never select a location to the left of v or to the right of 1 -v since it would then inefficiently "over cover" the market.
In Figure 2 a comparison is made between program quality levels of v and 1/2. The increase in ratings (demand) that the broadcaster receives from a quality level of 1/2 compared to the lower quality level v is equal to the distance from 0 to k plus the distance m to 1. Both the distance 0 to k and m to 1 is equal to the distance between v and 1/2. Thus, a given increase in quality results in twice that level of increase in demand, leading to a marginal revenue from quality increases that equals two. However, once quality levels reach 1/2, the market is fully covered (all potential viewers are watching the monopolist's program), and any incremental increase in quality results in no additional increase in demand. In other words, the marginal revenue from quality increases becomes zero. As a result, the monopoly broadcaster will never set a quality level that is greater than 1/2.
The cost structure given in (2) implies that the marginal cost of quality provision is 2cv. Thus the optimal quality level for the monopolist is v = 1/c. 7 The market is not fully covered when
The 45¢ lines kl and lm result from the use of the absolute value ideal-point term in the viewers' utility functions. 6 We thank the Area Editor for suggesting the use of viewer surplus "triangles". 7 This equals r/c £ , implying that a higher advertising rate per ratings point results in higher optimal quality provision on the part of the broadcaster, all other things being equal. and the monopolist is indifferent between choosing any location within
the monopolist locates at the center with a quality of 1/2, and the market is fully covered.
Duopoly competitive behavior
The equilibrium results for a competitive duopoly for all values of c are briefly summarized in §3.2.1. However, for ease of exposition, and to highlight the main substantive results, we focus on the discussion of a specific value of c (c = 2.7).
An overview of the general pure strategy duopoly equilibrium
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In our analysis, we assume that each broadcaster maximizes profit by simultaneously selecting its quality level and program type. When there are two broadcasters (A and B) in the market, two exclusive cases can be distinguished -one in which there is no competition in the center, and the other in which the duopolists directly compete. Without loss of generality, broadcaster A is assumed to be on the left-hand side of the market. In this model, both broadcasters first attempt to capture the greatest number of viewers from their "uncontested hinterlands" before competing for the "contested" demand in the market center. It is thus optimal that d¨= v¨and d© = 1 -v© . ), then it will capture the entire market. Because it enables broadcaster A to capture the entire market, it would be optimal for A to follow this strategy even though this would result in the market being over covered. In order to survive, broadcaster B would then have to respond with an even higher quality level, which would result in its capturing the entire market. This situation represents a quality analogue of a price war in a Bertrand pricing game (a "quality war"). No Nash equilibrium in pure strategies exists if a quality war is initiated.
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To summarize, when c is comparatively low, the broadcasters can afford to provide high quality programs that not only allow them to keep their hinterlands covered, but also aggressively compete for the market center. Indeed, when 0 ) c < 8/3, no pure strategy Nash equilibrium exists as the duopolists try to drive one another out of the market by engaging in a quality war. Conversely, when it is very expensive to provide quality (i.e., c ¤ 4), the broadcasters will be motivated to behave as local monopolists, and set v¥ = 1/c at equilibrium. When c is in the middle range (i.e.,
8/3
) c < 4), the boundary situation between local monopoly and direct competition occurs. The broadcasters provide programs with a quality level of
, respectively; and their 10 In this paper we focus on situations where an equilibrium in pure strategies exists. We leave the issue of examining the nature of the equilibrium for low values of c for future research. markets marginally touch each other at the center.
11 In this paper, our focus is on this case (i.e., where a pure Nash equilibrium strategy exists), and we choose c = 2.7 to represent this case.
3.2.2
The duopoly broadcaster's optimal positioning when c = 2.7
As the previous section indicates, the pure strategy equilibrium when c = 2.7 is when c = 2.7. 13 This result seems counter-intuitive as one might expect that with more competitors, the quality levels would be higher as a result of intensified competition. However, since providing quality television programs is costly, broadcasters make a trade-off between the gains in viewership by increasing quality and the higher programming costs. The existence of a second competitor (as opposed to a pure monopoly) halves the marginal revenue of quality improvement once the two 11 This "sticky" range for c in which both broadcasters set program quality at 1/4 is a result of the discontinuity in both broadcasters' quality provision marginal revenue curves. 12 In the appendix to this paper, we show that this is indeed an equilibrium, and that it is in fact a unique equilibrium. 13 In Technical Appendix 3 we extend this analysis to compare quality levels provided in a triopoly market compared to a duopoly market. This analysis indicates that for certain values of c, program quality is greater under the duopoly structure vis-à-vis the triopoly structure. broadcasters directly compete, thereby discouraging them from investing in relatively high quality levels. This result can be summarized as follows: Table 1 .1). Theorem 2 suggests that, given this changed competitive environment, the big three networks may find it optimal to decrease the costs of programming.
The recent history of the U.S. television industry is consistent with this. By the early 1990s cable penetration (the technological enabler of increased competition) had reached 60% of U.S.
households, making cable networks and FOX important competitors to the traditional three networks. In the 1991-92 and 1992-93 television seasons, CBS was the highest rated network. However, in both years CBS not only did not lead the industry in profitability, it actually lost moneyneither of which had ever occurred before in the industry's history. Jankowski and Fuchs (1995), both of whom were senior executives at CBS during this period, suggest that these losses were mainly due to spending too much on high quality programming.
This event precipitated a shift in the competitive strategy of the three major networks. In particular, the big three had historically competed by offering increasingly more expensive (i.e., higher quality) programming. Since the mid-1990s they have attempted to find ways to lower programming costs. Within the context of our model, costs can be reduced by lowering program quality. However, the ability to lower quality and still produce a "watchable" program in a competitive environment is very limited. Consequently, the primary way for networks to do this is to switch to programming types which are less expensive to produce, (e.g., Barwise and Ehrenberg, 1988; Jankowski and Fuchs, 1995) . For example, a one-hour theatrical program such as a situation comedy costs around $1.5 million to produce, while a one-hour newsmagazine costs as little as $250,000 (Vogel, 1998) . Indeed, from July 1996 to July 1998, ABC, CBS, NBC, CNN, and Fox more than doubled their newsmagazine airtime from a total of 26 hours per month to 63 hours in prime time (Wolf 1999) . Other lower cost program genres such as game shows and so-called "reality" programs have also become much more common in network prime time in recent years.
Another implication of Theorem 2 relates to the phenomenon of "narrow-casting." Recall that a broadcaster's market coverage (i.e., the range of viewer ideal points along the horizontal dimension captured by the broadcaster) depends upon its program quality. The lower quality level in the duopoly market reduces the range of viewers a broadcaster can attract.
Viewer welfare when c = 2.7
An important public policy question is whether total viewer welfare is greater in the duopoly market or the monopoly market. It is normally taken for granted that more competition is unambiguously better for consumers. However, although viewers on average receive a better match between their taste and the programs offered in the duopoly market, they can expect higher quality levels under the monopoly. Because viewing utility depends upon both the taste dimension and the quality dimension, on average a viewer is not necessarily better-off or worse-off when a higher quality program is provided but the program is a greater distance from her ideal point, or vice versa.
Our model provides a natural setting to examine how viewer welfare is influenced by market structure. The total viewer surplus (TVS), which corresponds to the area of the viewer surplus triangles in figures 1 to 5, can be calculated for both the monopoly and duopoly markets. Specifically, TVS = 1/2(2)(1/2.7) § = 0.137 for the monopoly market, and
for the duopoly market. In this instance (when c = 2.7) viewers are better off in the monopoly market. This result, summarized in the theorem below, indicates that the higher quality level the monopolist provides can more than offset its deficiency in program variety, and contradicts the commonly held view that more choice alternatives always make viewers better-off.
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Theorem 3. The decrement in quality levels caused by having more broadcasters in the industry can be great enough to result in viewers having lower total surplus than would be the case if there were fewer broadcasters.
One of the primary justifications for the regulation of television broadcasting is to insure that the publicly owned broadcast frequency spectrum is used to "serve the public interest." Central to the public interest is providing viewer welfare. An assumption likely to be underlying much of the recent deregulation of television broadcasting is that allowing for a greater number of competitors is likely to result in greater viewer welfare through the provision of a larger number of viewing options. Our results indicate that this may be true only up to a certain point, after which the addition of another competitor actually reduces total viewer welfare.
A two-period dynamic model
The model we have analyzed so far captures monopoly and duopoly behavior in a single time-slot.
It illustrates the fundamental features of competition when broadcasters choose the quality and type of programs they offer, and reveals the characteristics of the market equilibrium. However, it does not address a number of other important empirical features of the industry. In order to examine the robustness of the results derived in the previous section, and to investigate the implications of these empirical features, we now extend the analysis to a dynamic setting.
One of most well known dynamic aspects of television viewing is the so-called "lead-in effect," which refers to the tendency of a viewer to stay with the same channel across adjoining programs.
The primary reason given for the existence of the lead-in effect is that watching TV is inherently a passive behavior (see, for example, Shachar and Emerson 2000) . People tend to disproportionately watch temporally adjoining programs on the same channel since changing channels requires effort, even with the help of a remote control. Such effort can be physical (e.g., finding the remote control under the sofa cushions) and/or psychological (e.g., browsing through different channels and deciding which one to watch). Several empirical researchers have incorporated the lead-in effect into viewing choice models, and have shown that the effect is very significant in determining individuals' viewing behavior (e.g., Goettler and Shachar 2001; Rust and Alpert 1984; Rust and Eechambadi 1989; Shachar and Emerson 2000) .
To capture the dynamics brought about by the lead-in effect, we assume that broadcasters compete over two time-slots in an evening, resulting in a two-period game. 15 As is done in most empirical studies (e.g., Rust and Alpert 1984) , we incorporate the lead-in effect as a transaction cost term in a viewer's utility function. The parameter is used to capture the dis-utility of switching if a viewer changes channels between the first and second time periods.
We denote the first period quality levels by In what follows below we examine the behavior of myopic (sequential decision making) viewers.
However, we have also examined the behavior of forward-looking viewers in depth. While some 15 Implicitly we assume that the start of an "evening" is the start of prime time network programing, and viewers have their sets turned-off prior to the start of prime time. While this assumption does not hold in reality, we believe that altering it would not change our substantive results. There are two reasons for this: (1) with the exception of network owned stations, the networks have little control over what programs their affiliates broadcast just prior to prime time, and (2) a very large plurality of viewers are actually likely to switch-on their sets during prime time.
of the details differ, the substantive findings are essentially identical across these two styles of ratings) relative to its rival in the first period, it should offer a program with higher relative quality (and thus a more highly rated program) in the second time period as well.
This theorem not only has implications for broadcasters' scheduling decisions, it is also potentially important for empirical models of viewer behavior. In terms of scheduling, it suggests that a broadcaster with a relatively high quality program should schedule that program to air on the same evening that it offers other relatively high quality programs in an effort to dominate the ratings for that evening. In practice, the major networks often design their schedules to do just that. For instance, NBC has "owned" Thursday evenings for over a decade by "stacking" that evening with a succession of high budget/high quality "must see TV" programs. CBS followed a similar strategy on Sunday evenings for many years. In addition, empirical estimates of the lead-in effect may be upwardly biased if a network's program quality decisions are not accounted for. 18 One important caveat to the findings is that, as we will see below, the two broadcasters will want to set quality levels that are identical with one another in each period (although, they both may set a different quality level in each of the two periods). However, a broadcaster's ability to do this rests on the assumption that program quality is under its complete control. As we discussed in §2.3, there are reasons to believe that this is unlikely to be the case in practice.
The unconditional optimal first period quality levels
Through the use of (3), each broadcaster's profit can be written as a function of the quality levels set by both of them in the first period. Doing this allows for the creation of a reaction function for each broadcaster that gives its optimal quality level as a function of its rival's quality level. By equating these two reaction functions, the optimal two period quality levels (when a pure strategy 18 In a recent paper, Danaher and Mawhinney (2001) have proposed developing television viewer choice models using an experimental methodology based on treatments that consist of "rescheduled" television program lineups (i.e., presenting different sets of program lineups to respondents that differ from the order in which the networks actually present those programs). They argue that this approach has advantages over using models estimated using observational data in developing optimal network schedules. Their outlook on this issue is consistent with our findings that program quality and schedule structure may be confounded with one another. ¤ 8/3, both broadcasters will offer programs of equal quality in both periods, and this quality level will be identical to the quality levels obtained in the static model. These results can be summarized as
Theorem 5. When a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies exists, and the market is fully covered, a broadcaster should never lead with a first period program that is of a lower quality level than its second period program, and may find it optimal to lead with a higher quality program in the first period.
This theorem is consistent with the well known "quality" lead-in strategy in which a television network places either a new program (whose true quality is unlikely to be known to the broadcaster) or a lower rated (likely lower quality) program after a well-established (known high quality) program.
Theorem 5 also has implications for empirical models of viewing behavior since there is the possibility that there are unobserved (on the part of an empirical researcher) elements of program quality that will influence both the viewership for a program, and the location of that program within a broadcaster's schedule. Most of the empirical models of viewing behavior (Goettler and Shachar 2001; Rust and Alpert 1984; Rust and Eechambadi 1989; Shachar and Emerson 2000) include schedule location (e.g., 8PM versus 8:30PM) as an explanatory variable. However, if a program's schedule location and its viewership are both influenced by its quality level, then empirical models of viewer behavior need to account for possible simultaneous equations bias, which has not been done to date.
Discussion
Summary
In this study we present a model of competitive behavior that is tailored to the institutional setting of commercial television broadcasting. Specifically, broadcasters compete by selecting the "type" of program to offer and the quality level (production values) of their program offering, but do not compete on price. The purpose of developing this model is to address the likely impacts of technological and regulatory changes in the television broadcasting industry. Nevertheless, the underlying findings on product positioning and the impact of the number of competitors on the quality of product offerings are likely to hold for a wide range of advertising supported industries such as Web-based portal servers and media (such as radio and newspapers) that are delivered either physically or electronically.
Our theoretical model suggests that broadcasters tend to choose an intermediate level of differentiation in terms of the type of programs they provide (they "counter program," but not to the full extent in a given time-slot). This is different from most studies of competitive positioning which find that either minimum differentiation, or maximum differentiation, or a mixture of max-min will occur (e.g., D'Aspremont et al. 1979; Hotelling 1929; Neven and Thisse 1990; Shaked and Sutton 1981; Vandenbosch and Weinberg 1995) . Second, depending on the cost of quality provision, broadcasters in industries with a greater number of competitors may set lower quality levels compared to broadcasters in industries with fewer competitors. Finally, as viewers, having more channels available does not necessarily make us better-off. As a result, broadcasting regulations designed to provide the greatest number of choices to the viewing public may not, in actual fact, be in the public interest.
In an extension of our basic model to a dynamic two-period setting that allows us to examine the impact of the well known lead-in effect on broadcasters' programming strategy, we find that a broadcaster that offers a higher quality program relative to its rival in the first time-slot has an incentive to also offer a higher quality program relative to competition in the second timeslot, resulting in it dominating an evening from a ratings perspective. In addition, we find that a broadcaster should never offer a lower quality program in the first time-slot compared to the program in the second time-slot, but may find it optimal to "lead with its best" in the first period.
Future research directions
We conclude by highlighting several areas that are in our view in particular need of further research. First, as we indicated earlier, relaxing the assumption that each broadcaster has only a single "channel" is likely to lead to a number of additional interesting insights. Multi-outlet ownership is on the rise in the industry. For example, General Electric/NBC owns, or partially owns, outlets such as NBC, MSNBC, CNBC, and PAX. We believe that such a study may provide important public policy implications concerning media ownership. Specifically, our intuition at this point is that a broadcaster will find it optimal to offer several different outlets, with the exact number of outlets determined by the broadcaster trading-off the fixed costs associated with opening a new outlet versus increasing the quality level of programming on existing outlets. From the perspective of our graphical presentation in Figures 1 to 5 , the effect of allowing for multiple outlet ownership is to create a number of relatively small viewer surplus triangles, which have a smaller total area than would a lesser number of relatively large viewer surplus triangles. As a result, we speculate that allowing for multiple outlet ownership may have an important adverse influence on viewer welfare. More generally, the question arises as to under what circumstances are people potentially worse-off when they have more rather than fewer choices.
The second area that may be worthwhile examining is the implications of uncertainty in developing broadcasters' programming strategies. There are at least three sources of uncertainty that should be considered: (1) uncertainty about the true quality of a broadcaster's own program prior to the debut of that program; (2) uncertainty about the true quality of a competitor's program prior to its debut; and (3) uncertainty about program quality on the part of at least a proportion of potential viewers that results from incomplete information. While program costs (production values) are highly correlated with program quality, that correlation is not perfect. Moreover, it is our belief that while a broadcaster will know the cost of its own programs, and have very good estimates of its competitors' program costs, viewers will largely be ignorant of this information.
Third, our analysis has focused solely on broadcasters following the traditional business model of relying almost exclusively on sales of advertising time as their revenue source. While this business model is still by far and away the dominant model in the industry based on ratings and revenues, other models based on fixed fees (used by HBO, Cinemax, and others) and purely variable fees (pay-per-view) are also used. One ironic turn of events is that while the percentage of programming on the traditional big three networks that is made up of comparatively expensive theatrical programs such as dramas and situation comedies has diminished since the early 1990s, the emphasis that HBO has placed on this type of programming (through such original HBO programs as the Sopranos, Sex in the City, and Six Feet Under) has greatly expanded over the same time period. Conversely, while pay-per-view television has existed for quite some time, its history has been more one of failure rather than success, and its fate is still under debate in the industry (Jankowski and Fuchs, 1995) . One of the most disastrous examples is NBC's attempt to provide selected events of the 1992 Barcelona Summer Olympic Games through pay-per-view. Given these different business models, and their apparent different levels of success, an important area of future research (both for the television industry and for Web based media outlets) is to look at the nature of competition and long-run equilibrium when firms using different business models compete with one another.
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Finally, our results suggest two different avenues for future empirical research. The first relates to the development of viewing choice models intended to improve television scheduling decisions.
We show that program quality is likely to have a direct effect on broadcasters' scheduling decisions, while it should also influence viewers' choices. Since program quality is unlikely to be fully observable by researchers developing these models, the possibility that they suffer from simultaneous equations bias looms large. As a result, there is a need to investigate the extent to which this is an issue (the work of Danaher and Mawhinney, 2001 suggests it may well be a significant problem), and to develop an appropriate set of instruments to address the problem if necessary. A second promising area of empirical research is to develop a new empirical industrial organization model of the television industry in order to investigate a number of the testable hypotheses that emerge from our findings. 
Duopoly competition when viewers are myopic
The optimal second period quality levels conditional on the first period quality levels 20 The location of the indifferent viewer in the second-period allows us to determine the equilibrium quality levels in this period. As a result of the cost of switching channels ( ), the location of the indifferent viewer in period-two ( 
